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IDACAS :
Internet Deterrent And Counter Attack Systems
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Install & label net services :
"Counter Attack Enabled
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Protect Your Servers - Think:
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- Cave Canem
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- Beware of the Dog
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- Vorsicht bissiger
Hund !
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Index
Deter hosts that launch un- provoked
security probes &/or intrusion attempts / attacks on
other sites : Consider Counter Attack !
Top of Page
- Many criminals are attempting Internet server
intrusion, with far more hostile intent than a sub set of
the foolish `Script Kiddies' who waste valuable
administrator time just for fun'
- Criminal fraudsters run fake bank
sites to defraud. Some doubtless on other's suborned
systems, (automatically searched for & discovered to be
insecure & invaded by criminals). Many system owners
don't much care if [part of ] their system is [perhaps
unknowingly] invaded & suborned, so as long as others
get hurt, not them, & it mostly seems to work, (which
clever fraudsters will probably ensure), & so long as
they the rightful owners don't have to pay out money for
competent security staff to ensure their servers are kept
secure, & not stolen / hijacked by criminals.
Here's one example of a
criminal fraud, it took very little time to analyse it,
& trace it back - lets have an automatic system to
immediately analyse, counter attack & cripple
criminal's bases - not difficult - just need to fund the
development - please help ! (Some people have a strangely
cautious approach to disabling a suborned server, but
police are happy to cripple a stolen vehicle being used by
criminals, so we should do same with suborned Internet
servers: counter attack quickly ! Don't just send an email
to eg Asia, & wait days for a reply to translate).
Instead counter attack with various instant measures.
- The problem is world wide. The American government has
long been reported as having counter attack capabilities.
References to American counter attack test networks: DETER & EMIST
- The rest of the world needs to develop its own
deterrents, as USA has consistently showed (from
approx 1982 to 2003), that it is prepared to
embargo sensitive software source exports, eg crypt.c etc,
even to close allies such as Britain.
- The rest of the (non American) world needs to develop
their own systems to [hopefully] co-operate with American
systems, but not to just beg from the American plate, which
would fail: Even if American technologists may be prepared
to share source code, the USA government is likely to
Munitions embargo either code &/or databases
- Very few sites that are platforms for intrusion
attempts, action an intrusion
complaint complete with log.
- Where complaints are issued to ISPs etc, ISPs usually
hide behind their TOS, even if they do reply, they don't
report who the miscreant was from their site/ customer
base, & what disciplinary actions was taken.
- Being polite & reporting un- provoked attacks does
not work.
- Active automatic defence may work better.
- Hostile counter attack may work yet better still.
Nothing less might encourage some sites to discipline
themselves &/or their users.
- ISPs who fail to inform complainants of efforts to
terminate an abuser, are irresponsible complacent profit
takers & commercial accomplices to crime, harbouring a
criminal, liable to deterrent counter attack.
- Public logs of sites that have
launched un- provoked attacks will help co-ordinate
automatic analysis of sites appropriate for automatic
defence or counter attack.
- It's time for war with sites & irresponsible ISPs
etc who host script kiddies, criminal fraudsters, & the
criminally negligent who run insecure systems suborned by
other criminals to perpetrate crime.
- Know
your Enemy: Tracking Botnets
Top of Page
This page & list are just confined to security attacks.
Other issues below, though also bad, are not dealt with
directly here.
- `Script Kiddies' who launch stupid robots that fill web
forms with rubbish etc.
- Spammers who use scripts to alphabet flood their
sometimes viral loaded excrement, & to seek open relays
etc to do it. : The seeking of open relays belongs to the
remit of this page. The prevention of spam does not belong
directly to this page. SPAM is dealt with already by lots
of others, eg volunteer organisations eg cauce.org. Public source code
anti spam software (inc. some in FreeBSD Ports, by
commercial anti spam & anti virus vendors, & by ISP
(net access providers' additional services)).
- (*) Denial Of Service - Flood Attacks.
- (*) `Warez' Illegal Bootleggers, who invade un-
safeguarded ftp servers & deposit eg bootleg copyright
films/ movies, music, pictures, sometimes also with illegal
&/or offensive content, beyond stolen copyright. The
upload often overflows discs & causes loss of service
to genuine users, & wasted time for administrators. The
mass parallel downloads cause excessive telecoms bills from
networking providers, & lack of availability /
performance for genuine users.
Items Marked (*) Whether these may or may not be dealt
with here is not yet decided, (a question of funding &
politics), Prime interest is security: thus intrusion
deterrence. Flood deterrence by counter flood is a
particularly sensitive area, needing careful management).
Top of Page
- The aim is to co-operate with lists & tools for
active dynamic defence & / or counter attack.
- Preference is to work on BSD (even nicer
than Linux), to work with tools compatible with the
extensive ports
collection of FreeBSD; later
porting anything necessary later to NetBSD (If multiple platforms
are needed. - But remember most design will be for
supplemental cheap BSD boxes to be connected to other
heterogenous Unix servers, so we won't need full native run
support on all Unixes direct); &/or OpenBSD (if security features
there appeal above other BSDs at assessment time).
- If you are a company,
organisation, or government agency with budget to help
sponsor this, or to purchase Internet Intruder, passive
&/or active defence, optionally with deterrent counter
attack systems, services, &/or consultancy, Vector Systems Ltd &
associates would be pleased to hear from
you. Consultancy also available for other Unix server
architectures.
Top of Page
The traditional soft European way that has Failed:
- Have a firewall, possibly with dynamic components, eg
traffic filters, access failure detectors, DOS (Denial of
service) traffic filters etc.
- Have an intrusion detection system
- Have optional `honey pots' to distract intruders &
help detection.
- Log attempted & actual intrusions, & collect
evidence to hopefully prosecute with (expensive)
lawyers.
- Fix Intrusions
Logging is worthwhile to improve defences, justify a security
budget, or counter attack. But ... Logging for management
satisfaction &/or national eg German habit of formality,
is a waste of money, when after admins carefully log &
collect evidence, lawyers decide its not cost effective to
sue internationally for damages.
- For many firms, the extra time off line, sealing
original attacked media as evidence, & preparing on
line duplicates, is business lost, & bad publicity even
admitting it happened.
- Cost example: Apparently German (or
Bavarian ?) police won't even forward an
incident worth less than 50K Euro to their USA compatriots
if incident launched from there, as not cost effective for
less.
- Many attempts are global, eg from Asia & ex Soviet
territory etc, some countries will obviously be next to
impossible to pursue intruders in.
- Some will be unattended compromised / cuckoo proxies
hosts)
- Some will be irresponsible large sub nets, who don't
really care until your problem becomes their problem, eg
Universities, Coffee shops with `Hot spots', Drive by
bluetooth (`war driving') connections, Lax ISPs with
dynamic IPs, etc.
Top of Page
- Better to have a deterrent totally automatic
co-operative counter attack system, to flood/ attack/
disable adversary hosts & nets, (regardless if
`innocent & subsumed' or not. - Turn back Your problem
to be Their Problem - & Advertise Your Counter Attack
facility prominently as a deterrent.
Top of Page
Some hosts that have recently launched un
provoked attacks on author's hosts. (just a tiny example
of a much wider problem).
Note I sometime don't bother logging isolated attacks,
systematic multiple attacks are more likely listed though.
Links to other lists are welcome. Mail me. URLs
A later list of hosts that co-operate to automatically
combat intruders probably won't ever appear here, but will be
be automatically updated by the protection software to be
developed.
Top of Page
Format subject to change:
"|" separated fields (not normal Unix convention of ":" eg
for tbl, as dates use ":".
Column Order
- DATEDate[s] of attack (TZ=CET or CEST, ie
GMT+01:00 or GMT+02:00 in summer). There may have been
numerous attack before & since. A minimum of one date
is noted. This column is first to ensure a sort will
recreate chronological log order.
- Number Of Attacker
-
DNS Address of Attacker OK or a Lie ?
Whether via nslookup, after using RARP to match the IP#
to name, the name then maps back full circle to IP
number, as it should.
Possible Values: (In sequential test &
possible result order)
| Key |
Explanation |
Conclusion |
Action Possible |
| "!RARP" |
R-ARP Fails: No DNS record maps number to
name. |
Secretive |
Counter attack. |
| "!FARP" |
Forward Lookup fails (Inverse of R-ARP Fails): No
DNS record maps name to number. (Even if number to
name succeeds). |
Secretive |
Counter attack. |
| "!A" |
A Fails: No DNS record maps resultant name back
to a number. |
Liar |
Counter attack. |
| "False" |
R-ARP & then DNS A-Name don't agree. |
Liar |
Counter attack. |
| "Match" |
DNS R-ARP & subsequent A records match, (even
if A rec might be a cluster of IP numbers) |
Perhaps a properly & honestly configured IP,
with rogue user(s) |
Warn First. |
- NAMEParent IP Domain Name of abuse@ owner of
domain (may well not be the same as the IP number of the
attacking host, eg attacking host
chopok.fns.uniba.sk gets mapped to owner
uniba.sk )
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REPLY Response if any.
| "Fixed+Detail" |
They fixed their problem, ie purged their
customer or their customer server purged the user
account etc. They appear to be an innocent provider
doing their best to responsibly purge miscreants.
They should Not be counter attacked. They are merely
listed here to show what (small) percentage of
providers take such responsible policing action. |
| "Auto" |
Automatic standard email reply |
| "NS" |
Not Sent: The results of nslookup &/ or
http:// access made the domain too suspicious to
complain to. |
Top of Page
- Currently we have just one mail list:
- deter@ To discuss how best to design automatic
counter attack technologies.
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Later the list may be split into sub lists, eg :
- deter-announce@ likely moderated to ensure
low traffic, basically just release announcements.
- deter-dev@ for developers & source
code
- deter-users@ a self help mutual assistance
group for users of the code & service. Users will
be server administrators.
- deter-finance@ to arrange funding of central
service portions of the project
- deter-law@ for those who want to discuss law
& morality, (though IMO, un- provoked attackers lack morality, & law has
failed & is pretty much irrelevant in a world with
190 nations that might house systems that could launch
attacks on computers in any of the other 190 nations.
Whose law ? A combination of 190 x 190 = 36100
combinations.
Top of Page
- A CVS based source code repository may later be
provided by Berklix.
- If we get public eg government or industry contribution
authorising a public repository.
- Alternatively, if the funding is not public, the
repository may have to be private too.
- The repository will be on berklix servers in Europe,
immune to disruption from insular/ nationalist USA
politicians who might want to again disrupt international
developer co-cooperation, (as USA government did with
Crypt.c & Munitions laws between about 1982 & 2003,
(despite the fact the then posited `enemy' already had
Crypt code).
Analysis of some Distributed Denial Of Service (DDOS)
tools
As intruders already have used these tools, we should
consider using similar tools for defence by deterrent counter
attack.
Top of Page
We need to combat attackers, optionally by counter intrusion
& attempted disabling, flood, etc. Optionally by counter
flood of compromised equally harmful proxies, to alert the
immediately upstream adjacent carriers, to realise _they_
have a problem customer to terminate immediately, & that
our problem is not theirs to ignore, but theirs to resolve,
urgently. We need to develop software & co-ordination
bases, for active, automatic, mutually co-ordinated, mass
multi server launched, hostile counter attack. It needs
safety checks to avoid Internet melt down. Variable
escalation criteria dependent on time zones, work days,
public holidays, root national domains, if targeting offender
direct, or escalation alert levels for innocent but possibly
lethargic neighbouring carrier etc. Systems envisaged to be
based on standard cheap PC Server hardware bases, linked to
the existing organisations gateways. Based on public source
code operating systems & tools, (eg
http://www.freebsd.org/ports/net & .../security ), thus
not vulnerable to Microsoft viruses, weaknesses &
exploits etc. Using code extensively security reviewed. Based
on open free co-operative international standards
(not proprietary commercial pseudo standards attempting to
monopolise the market). To run on Internet server systems,
installed & run by professionals, to protect users, but
Not for end users to run themselves. National co-ordination
servers may or may not be under national control, but the
technology itself should be internationally co-operative.
Top of Page
The term `Hacker' is mostly wrongly used,
exhibiting how ignorant the speaker is.
`Hacker' is just a name for a usually well
intentioned
- programmer who hacks up (generates) code of
public benefit to give away ,
- journalist, who hacks up articles to be
published
- horse rider, who I suppose hacks up hedges
jumping across
. `Cracker' is a better pejorative to apply to
Internet intruders. The same word "Cracker" as in "Safe
Cracker", a specialist burglar who steals
valuables.
Extra Disclaimer: Content
of links may or may not be agreed with, but may have pointers
to technology, laws, disputes, etc.
Top of Page
More legal verbiage may be necessary here later, but when
reading this page, writing tools, or reading the list, etc
note:
- New entries to the Un-provoked
Attackers List may be innocent, they may just not have
had time to track & kill their rogue user account &
report back yet.
- Some hosts may be innocent, just having DNS entries
screwed, or in transition.
- Some sites may be innocent, just having guilty host
computer(s).
- Some hosts may have been for innocent purposes, but
been cracked & compromised.
- Some administrators may be innocent, but clueless or
incompetent.
- Some hosts may be largely innocent, but with one or
more guilty users.
- Recipient (of attack & investigating ISPs return
mail) may have been away & not received response
yet.
- Occasional mail failure may occur.
- IP spoofing etc exists.
- Use your own detective skills, including comparing this
list to other intrusion lists, to decide yourself which
sites merit counter attack.
- I don't guarantee all intrusion attempts I know of will
be logged. (Some recipients of un- provoked attack may not
want that). Others may qualify for immediate defence or
hostile counter attack etc, particularly repeat
offenders.
- The Disclaimer on the side
bar applies.
- The Extra Disclaimer above
applies.
- Counter attacking is doubtless illegal in some
jurisdictions. Especially where politicians haven't woken
up to the fact the Internet has no national boundaries,
& local laws do Not protect their citizens & state
infrastructure.
- Where any legal jurisdiction forbids something, I &
we do Not encourage you to do it.
- It's Your responsibility to comply with Your laws,
wherever you are on planet Earth.
- I & we hereby disclaim everything in & out of
sight & inference etc.
- Use your common sense !
- Decide yourself what's moral, legal, technically
feasible, reasonably or likely safe, unsafe etc.
Top of Page
-
Russia accused of unleashing cyberwar to disable
Estonia
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[11/5/2003] NSF grant funds development of computer network
security mechanisms
The DETER and EMIST projects are funded by the National
Science Foundation in collaboration with the U.S. Department
of Homeland Security.
- http://www.isi.edu/deter/ A
Laboratory for Security Research
- Chinesische
Trojaner auf PCs im Kanzleramt 25. August 2007
- Chinesische
Hacker legen Pentagon-Computer
lahm 04. September 2007
- 2009.04: 3 Year 3 x 10^6 EU project split between 2
Universities: (Just detection project, not counter
attack).
Uni entwickelt Alarmanlage gegen Hacker-Angriffe Bremen (dpa) - Ein neues
Frühwarnsystem soll Computer-Netzwerke künötig
besser gegen Hacker-Angriffe
schützen. Forscher der Universität Bremen und der
Fachhochschule Gelsenkirchen entwickeln zurzeit eine Art
Alarmanlage, die Datenspionage rechtzeitig aufdecken und
Schäden so verhindern soll. Diesen Artikel weiter lesen
«75 Prozent dieser Angriffe können bisher nicht
erkannt werden», sagte der Bremer Projektleiter Otthein
Herzog am Montag. Das System soll auf künstlicher
Intelligenz basieren. «Es lernt mit jedem Angriff dazu
und wird besser.» Das Bundesforschungsministerium
unterstützt das auf drei Jahre angelegte Projekt mit
rund 2,7 Millionen Euro.
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Otthein Herzog, Professor für Künstliche
Intelligenz ... Gelsenkirchener Professor Norbert
Pohlmann.
- BBC World TV 2008 07 09 14:00 GMT+2 Reported "Denial Of
Service" ie flood attacks against South Korean Government
& Banks. Apparently North Korea has made thinly veiled
threats before. Speculation is special unit of North Korean
army has over 1,000 skilled staff for such things.
- A German Test
Net - german-lab.de - pages In English
- BBC:
08:18 GMT, Tuesday, 17 November 2009 : Age of cyber warfare
is 'dawning' ... The UK, Germany, France, China and North
Korea are known to be developing their own
capabilities.
- BBC: 12:37
GMT, Tuesday, 3 February 2009 : Nato's cyber defence
warriors
- BBC Wednesday 13 January , Radio
4, Programme Today In parliament, Admiral Lord West
statement: State actors ie countries stealing complete plans
of planes + crime, terrorists etc.
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A TV prog in German, 2011.02, reported:
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German: Sueddeutsche Zeitung : Kriegsführung im
Cyberspace Unsichtbare Angriffe mit realen Folgen
23.09.2010
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2010.12.10: Operation Payback
A co-operative DOS attack on Visa Europe, Mastercard,
(& maybe Pay Pal & a Swiss Bank), in response to
payment companies pulling facilities for Wikileaks
The USA led payments withdrawal attack on wikileaks was in
parallel to founder Australian Julian Assange being
prosecuted for rape by Sweden, & suspicion USA
government might lean on Britain to honour European
extradition warrant for Julian Assange to Sweden, from
where fears are, he might be further extradited to USA,
where he could fear for his life.
(Looney USA politicians mouthing off again.) Those
financial companies & politician were then counter
cyber attacked.
Interesting new aspect: Some people are
volunteering their machines to launch co-operative DOS
attacks on their enemies (of wikileaks in this case),
DOS attacks are now not just from normal rogue states
& heap of crappy MS OS PCs infested by viruses etc. The
technology is now mainstream & attracts volunteer
users. Cyber attack proliferation has occurred.
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2011 05 24 Spiegel "NATO vs. Cyber Attackers - Internal Memo
Reveals 'Robust' Efforts to Counter Threats" by Der
Spiegel Memo from Rasmussen, ... intent: ""full
operational capability" to respond to cyber threats by 2012"
... "Germany, the National Cyber Security Council recently
held its first meeting to coordinate the work of the newly
established National Cyber Response Center."
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2011 06 16 Der Spiegel - Fighting Internet Threats - Germany
Arms Itself for Cyber War By Sebastian Fischer and Ole
Reissmann
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2011 06 20 SZ: Konzerne: Cyberwar Boeing und EADS rüsten
digital auf
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First Annual Cost of Cyber Crime Study
Benchmark Study of U.S. Companies
Sponsored by ArcSight ArcSight (An HP
company)
Independently conducted by Ponemon Institute LLC
Publication Date: July 2010
Download (URL @ 2011_06_28
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